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From Danish Conglomerate to Global Specialist 
 
Abstract 
Over the past decade, European businesses have accelerated internationalization, expanding within 
and beyond Europe. I argue that a major driving force behind this push towards global presence is 
the restructuring of corporate diversification strategies, which in turn is a result of gradual changes 
in industry structure and the institutional environment in home markets as well as global markets. 
 The strategic change converts diversified conglomerates to global specialists in narrower 
niche markets. It brings them in direct confrontation with a small number of key competitors 
operating worldwide. On this stage, key competitive advantages are gained by making best use of 
resources across the world, and by effective global integration of operations. Hence de-
diversification and internationalization are opposite sides of the same coin: globalfocusing. 
 The argument is developed based on inductive case research of the restructuring in two 
Danish manufacturing enterprises, and a review of overall trends in Danish businesses. On this 
basis, I analyze the economic and institutional forces driving this process, and suggest propositions 
for empirical testing. The paper points to consequences of liberalization, and is thus of high 
relevance for managers and policy makers in countries that are not yet as open as Denmark. 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, European businesses have accelerated their internationalization, expanding not only 
within traditional markets of Western Europe, but to emerging markets in Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin 
America. At the same time, ‘focus’ has become a buzzword in corporate boardrooms, as firms pursue core 
competencies and divest peripheral activities in terms of their product portfolio. The literature treats 
diversification and internationalization as largely distinct phenomena. However, the two strategies are 
opposite sides of the same coin, as firms engage in “globalfocusing”. 
 Research addressing simultaneously internationalization and diversification analyzes the impact of 
alternative strategic postures on performance using cross section data of US firms (Tallman and Li 1996, 
Hitt, Hoskisson and Kim 1997), and Japanese firms (Delios and Beamish 1999, Geringer, Tallman and Olsen 
2000). This research finds linear and non-linear effects as well as interaction between international and 
diversification profile, yet these effects vary across studies such that the results are generally considered 
inconclusive. Moreover, cross-sectional studies do not address how and why strategies change over time. 
Thus Hitt et al. (1997: 793) conclude that there is “a need to understand the combined evolutionary path of 
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international and product diversification” and that “the link between international diversification and 
business-level strategies should be explored”. Similarly, other studies on diversification and 
internationalization conclude with a call for “specific analysis of changes over time to reveal the dynamics of 
strategic change” (Geringer et al. 2000: 76, also see Tallmann and Li 1996). If the process of change from 
one type of strategy to another was better understood, the insights of cross-section comparative studies could 
be transformed into more specific advice to managers. This study aims to address both strategies and 
associated change processes by employing a longitudinal research design.  
 The paper moreover incorporates “the effects of changing environmental conditions on strategy”, 
another need identified by Geringer et al (2000:76). In this, it contributes to the theoretical literature 
analyzing the impact of institutions on strategic management (Murtha and Lenway 1994, Olivier 1997, Peng 
2001). Institutional perspectives have recently been applied to both diversification strategies (Khanna and 
Palepu 2000, Kock and Guillén 2000, Wan and Hoskisson 2003) and international business, where scholars 
analyzed institutional influences on foreign direct investment strategies (Henisz 2000, Delios and Henisz 
2000, Meyer 2001, Mudambi and Navarra 2002). This paper focuses on the institutions in the home 
environment and their impact on internationalization strategies.  
 This paper aims to build theory from cases studies (Eisenhardt 1989). Based on two longitudinal 
case studies, I document how firms pursue a strategy of ‘globalfocusing’, that is simultaneous de-
diversification and internationalization. Both case firms have expanded their core business to establish 
worldwide market presence and integrated global operations. Yet this accelerated internationalization of the 
firm was related to a sharp reduction of their product portfolios. Thus acquisitions in the core business and 
divestments in non-core businesses are causally related (Capron 1999, Capron et al. 2001), as firms 
implement a globalfocusing strategy. The direction of change is also found in a broader set of large Danish 
firms, notably for those serving business-to-business (B2B) markets, and for those owned by outside 
financial investors. I argue that the two changes in corporate strategy are part of the same reconfiguration 
process, and induced by changes in the domestic and global institutional environment and industry structure. 
Globalization and increased competitiveness of key markets gives the competitive edge to industry 
specialists that can leverage industry-specific resources across their global operations.  
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Section 2 introduces the theoretical perspectives on internationalization and diversification 
strategies, with special attention to moderating effects arising from the institutional environment. In section 
3, I use a case-based inductive approach to reassess theoretical priors and to refine theoretical models. I 
analyze the patterns of internationalization and diversification for the largest Danish businesses from 1990 to 
2000, with a focus on two longitudinal company-case studies, Danisco and GN Great Nordic. Section 4 
interprets the evidence in light of the aforementioned theories, and suggests testable propositions concerning 
external and internal factors influencing globalfocusing. Section 5 concludes by outlining the implications of 
the strategic changes for management practice and for theory development. 
 
2. Theoretical Perspectives 
 
2.1. Internationalization strategies 
The expansion of firm’s international business over time is most commonly analyzed with the 
internationalization process model (Johansen and Vahlne 1977, 1990). The model explains the pattern of 
gradual expansion of international business as a result of an interactive process of incrementally increasing 
commitments to foreign markets and building capabilities. Managers take decisions over possible business 
abroad based on the information and resources available to them at the time. The decision leads to a 
commitment of resources to the foreign country, which in turn leads to learning processes, and thus enhanced 
capabilities valuable in international business. Hence foreign entry is an incremental process driven by 
resource accumulation.  
The logic developed to explain the process of building resources, that in turn drive business 
strategies, resembles that of the resource-based view (Wernerfeld 1984, Barney 1991) that has attained a 
pivotal position in recent strategic management and international business research. In fact both lines of 
research have derived key arguments from Penrose’s (1959) Theory of the Growth of the Firm and Cyert and 
March’s (1963) Behavioral Theory of the Firm.  
 The internationalization process model explains the typical patterns observed by Johansen and 
Vahlne (1977), i.e. the start of international business in nearby countries with gradual expansion to more 
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distant markets, and the start with export and non-equity modes of business, with gradual expansion to 
contractual and share-equity modes, and eventually wholly owned subsidiaries. Yet, the essential 
contribution of the Swedish scholars is the theoretical description of the underlying processes that lead to 
these typical patterns (Benito and Welch 1994).  
However, this model provides only a partial explanation of the growth of international business. 
Scholars have observed that firms increasingly jump stages of the typical pattern, i.e. progressing rapidly 
from exports, to contractual cooperation, and to wholly-owned foreign affiliates, and enter distant emerging 
markets already at an early stage of their international business. Moreover, studies showed that other 
influences such as competition are important moderating variables that have to be included in the analysis 
(e.g. Sölvell 1987, Nordström 1991).  
The model focuses on the internal development of resources such as knowledge pertaining to 
international business. Acquisitions accelerate firms’ resource accumulation process. Yet although 
acquisitions are the dominant method of international expansion by the end of the 20th century (UN 2000), 
they have rarely been integrated in IP-theorizing. An international acquisition provides the firm with many 
resources, that it might otherwise build internally. Yet why do firms desire to build or acquire these 
resources? What drives firms to pursue international growth, notably in emerging markets, rather than 
domestic growth as they might have two or three decades ago? I argue that external competitive pressures in 
both financial and output markets as well as the interdependence between internationalization and 
diversification provide an important complementary explanation. To develop the argument, I first review the 
literature on diversification.  
 
2.2. Diversification strategies  
The word ‘diversified firm’ often has a negative connotation when used by today’s financial market analysts. 
As everyone strives to establish ‘core competences’ (Prahalad and Hamel 1990) and to pursue ‘focused’ 
business strategies, it is easily forgotten that diversification has been en vogue worldwide only three decades 
ago (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987, Shleifer and Vishny 1991). From the 1950s to the 1970s, firms pursued 
growth through diversification: for example among the Fortune 500 list of largest US companies, the 
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proportion of single business companies fell from 42% in 1949 to 14.4% in 1974, while the proportion of 
related diversified firms rose to from 25.7% to 42.3%, and unrelated diversified firms from 4.1% to 20.7% 
(Rumelt 1982). Diversification allows firms to pursue growth and risk diversification, and they may be able 
to internalize markets such as capital or managerial labor.  
Growth is arguably more important to managers than to shareholders, as managers’ own salary and 
prestige is often more coupled with the size and power of their firm than with profitability. If owners do not 
have appropriate means to ensure that managers act in their interest, then principal-agents conflicts may 
evolve that allow managers to pursue their own objectives. Already Morris (1964) argued that managers’ 
growth ambitions encourage the firm to invest at a higher rate than would be consistent with profit 
maximization. Such ‘empire building’ may moreover help managers’ personal objectives by permitting 
managerial entrenchment because diversification increases the need for the type of skills that top managers 
provide (Shleifer and Vishny 1991).  
A second advantage of a diversified firm, from the perspective of managers and employees, is that 
financial risks are spread across industries, which provides for more stable profits and lower bankruptcy risk. 
Financial investors can spread risk by holding a diversified portfolio of securities. However, diversification 
lowers only unsystematic risk but not systematic risk, and no better than investors can do themselves in 
efficient capital markets. Hence, risk reduction through diversification does not create shareholder value 
(Ross and Westerfeld 1988),1 and it is more in the interest of managers than of shareholders. Hence a 
substantive literature applying agency theory considers high degrees of diversification as indication of 
ineffective corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny 1991), and associates changes in governance with 
changes in diversification (Hoskisson and Turk 1990, Hoskisson and Hitt 1994, Chatterjee et al. 2003).  
However, diversification can also be seen as an outcome of an emergent growth strategy. Firms 
continuously develop new resources, and then seek new applications for them (Penrose 1959). Resources are 
often indivisible and, especially in the case of knowledge based assets, difficult to transfer using market 
                                                 
1  Empirical research has shown that diversified firms trade at a discount on US stock markets (e.g. Lang & Stulz 1994, 
Berger and Ofek 1995), but this pattern could not be confirmed for smaller countries like Germany where at least 
diversified firms that are also internationally active are traded at a premium (Lins and Servaes 1999, Dastitar 2002). 
Moeover, empirical evidence for the US shows that refocusing improves corporate performance (Markides 1995). 
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mechanisms. Hence firms deploying resources to new applications may grow organically into new industries, 
thus gradually expanding their product diversification. Eventually, firms would, according to Penrose, 
exceed their optimal size and spin-off business units into new independent firms. The resource-based view 
(RBV) of the firm (Wernerfeld 1984, Barney 1991) has taken up the ideas of Penrose and explains the 
growth and diversification of firms by these internal processes of resource accumulation and redeployment.  
Resources include physical assets and human and organizational capabilities that are at the same 
time valuable, rare, difficult to imitate, not easily substitutable and relatively indivisible (Wernerfeld 1984, 
Barney 1991). They are unique to each firm, and enable it to gain competitive advantages over competitors. 
Firms accumulate resources in a dynamic way, through internal growth, e.g. organizational learning, as well 
as by acquisition of external resources (Penrose 1959, Teece et al. 1997). However, resources come in 
bundles that are indivisible and often tacit such they cannot be sold to other businesses. Hence, some 
resources are ‘slack’ in that they are not necessary for current operations, but can be used to grow internally 
(Teece 1982). These tacit properties apply especially to organizational meta-capabilities, also known as 
‘dynamic capabilities’, that allow firms to develop and apply new capabilities (Teece et al. 1997, Eisenhardt 
and Martin 2000).  This internally driven growth can lead to diversification, especially if resources are not 
specific to one product. However, at some stage, the firm may exceed its optimal size, and thus spin-off 
peripheral businesses (Penrose 1959). 
However, most applications for existing resources are in related areas, and organizational learning 
leads to path-dependent patterns of growth (Diericks and Cool, 1989). This is reinforced by competitive 
pressures to be efficient, and thus to optimize the use of organizational and technological capabilities. Firms 
pursuing internal growth can better realize synergies by diversifying into products that are related to their 
existing capabilities (Teece et al. 1997). Hence, firms would diversify into related industries based on 
organizational and technological capabilities, and exploit economies of scope. This prediction is supported 
by empirical evidence that related diversification leads to better performance than unrelated diversification. 
Rumelt (1982) in his much-cited study established positive effects of related diversification on performance, 
and this result has been replicated in several studies (reviewed in Montgomery 1994).  
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2.3. An institutional perspective on diversification 
A different motivation for diversification is the internalization of markets that are subject to high transaction 
costs. These costs arise in institutional arrangements that fail to ensure efficiency of the market mechanism. 
In some countries, such failure has been observed for capital and top-end human capital markets, and 
induced unrelated diversification to internalize these markets (Peng 2001, Cuervo-Cazurra and Toulan 2002). 
Internal markets would overcome failures of external markets, such that the degree of firm’s diversification 
has been described as a function of institutional development (Khanna and Palepu 2000).  
Market failures affect for instance financial markets that lack adequate disclosure rules or accounting 
and auditing standards. Intermediaries such as investment bankers, venture capitalists and financial analysts 
may not exist. This increases transaction costs of the local capital market as investors would have to invest 
more heavily in securing information, or face higher risk of debtor default. Large conglomerates can bypass 
such costly capital markets by setting up internal capital markets. Similarly, they can create internal labor 
markets for highly qualified personnel where external recruitment is difficult or costly. Diversified firms can 
thus reduce transaction costs by internalization (Khanna and Palepu 2000).  
The institutional environment moreover shapes the selection mechanisms by which competition 
selects which firms perform best, and survive. Less transparent or instable institutional environments require 
more ‘adaptability’ than the relatively stabile mature market economies. In societies where personal 
relationships are important, ‘contact capabilities’ may be valuable resource that can be shared across 
businesses. Hence, diversified business groups may be the most suitable form to grow, especially if access by 
outsiders is obstructed by protectionism (Kock and Guillén 2000). At the same time, large conglomerates 
may have a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis state bureaucracies and political agents.  
Moreover, extensive government intervention in the economy can lead to multiple distortions in 
markets, raising transaction costs of external markets, while at the same time creating barriers to entry for 
both potential domestic and foreign competitors. If government intervention directly or indirectly protects a 
monopolist or monopsonist, then this firm may aim to extend its market power through backward or forward 
integration. This can be done through foreclosing access to critical resources (Hart and Tirole 1990) or by 
price discrimination (Philips 1983). Similarly, firms may be able to transfer their market power by horizontal 
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expansion in related industries, for example by leveraging bargaining power with common customers across 
industries. In consequence diversified firms are more common in less open and less market-oriented 
economies (Khanna and Palepu 2000, Peng 2001, Cuervo-Cazurra and Toulan 2002, Wan and Hoskisson 
2003). 
If high levels of government involvement encourage diversification, then alterations in policy may 
reverse this effect. Institutional change leads to re-evaluation of resource investments by changing the 
competitive environments in factor and product markets, and thus the availability of external resources, and 
the relative value of firms’ internal resources. Most notably, more sophisticated market supporting 
institutions reduce the need to internalize capital or managerial labor markets, as shown for instance by 
Toulan (2002) for Argentina. 
In consequence, liberalization of input, output and financial markets can be expected to lead to a 
process of industrial restructuring as firms reduce horizontal diversification in unrelated industries, and 
strengthen their core businesses (Cuervo-Cazurra and Toulan 2002). Transaction costs decline as institutions 
become more effective in regulating markets, providing information on potential partner firms and 
employees, and reducing the scope for corruption (Khanna and Palepu 2000). Moreover, context-specific 
capabilities for dealing with a highly regulated and instable market, such as contact capabilities (Kock and 
Guillén 2000), decline in importance relative to technological and organizational capabilities. Hence, the 
rationale for internalizing markets diminishes with institutional development. Capital and skilled labor are 
more readily available at competitive prices, and intermediate products will be exchanged based on 
appropriately designed contracts (Khanna and Palepu 1997, 2000). At the same time, industry-specific 
technological and organizational capabilities become more important, such that the rationale for internalizing 
markets for capital, labor and country-specific capabilities diminishes.  
To sum up, the institutional perspective shows that institutions influence transaction costs and the 
development of resources and capabilities. Firms use diversification to internalize inefficient markets, and to 
share capabilities that are context-specific rather than industry-specific. In consequence, changes in the 
institutional framework can affect the rationale for diversification, and thus the structure of industry. 
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2.4. Issues for Analysis 
The two key issues of global strategy, internationalization and diversification are analyzed by largely 
separate literatures. Yet there also exits some evidence, that the two strategies are interrelated (Tallman and 
Li 1996, Hitt et al. 1997, Delios and Beamish 1999, Geringer et al. 2000, Doukas and Lang 2003). In this 
research, I use a qualitative approach to take a fresh look at the issue, and explore if and how they are 
related. Hence, the interdependence of growth in the international and the product range dimensions is 
analyzed with a focus on the following specific questions: 
 
 How are internationalization and diversification empirically and causally related?  
 What induces firms to engage in globalfocusing, that is simultaneously to de-diversify and 
internationalize? 
 
3. Case Study Research in Denmark 
Denmark is an appropriate setting for studying internationalization and corporate restructuring because the 
country is a small open economy, where international competition has in many industries become the norm. 
In this way, Denmark may be a lead economy exhibiting trends and features that other countries may 
develop when they reach similar degrees of openness. The relatively small size of the economy makes it 
moreover feasible to study an entire population of medium and large companies, looking beyond those that 
are stock market traded. The institutions supporting the market economy have been comparatively 
sophisticated for many years, and markets have been fairly efficient. The forces of globalization, in particular 
the liberalization associated with the EU internal market created in 1992 has gradually increased competition 
and financial market-based governance. In the last decade of the 20th century, Danish businesses rapidly 
increased their international profile (Benito et al. 2002). 
The analysis begins with two in-depth longitudinal case studies, which are then extended to the largest 
Danish manufacturing firms to see if the patterns and processes identified in the case firms are representative 
for the period 1990 to 2000. Both case studies were started with an investigation into the firms’ latest steps 
of internationalisation, based on interviews of managers in Hong Kong and Shanghai respectively, and 
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archival sources obtained locally and in Denmark. To investigate the link between recent entries and 
corporate strategy, further interviews were conducted with members of the corporate boards in Copenhagen. 
In total 8 managers have been interviewed, some twice, for between 30 and 90 minutes. In the case study 
research process, theoretical priors were continuously reassessed (Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 1994). Initially, the 
internationalisation process model (Johansen and Vahlne 1977, 1990) was used as primary point of 
reference, but it emerged from the empirical data that this model is not well suited to explain the interesting 
dynamics in the case firm. This led to the new dynamic conceptualisation of ‘globalfocusing’. The facts 
reported below are largely based on archival sources such as annual reports and articles in the Danish press 
and have been discussed extensively with company and industry insiders.  
GN Great Northern and Danisco are major Danish companies traded on the Copenhagen stock 
exchange that in recent years expanded in Asia. In the following summaries, I review the evolution of 
corporate strategy before focusing on the strategy of one major business unit, respectively Danisco 
Ingredients and GN Netcom. 
***** 
Table 1a to 1c approximately here 
***** 
3.1.  Danisco: From food conglomerate to ingredients specialist 
Danisco A/S was created in 1989 through the merger of three food processing companies with overlapping 
business interests: AS Danisco, Danish Distillers and Danish Sugar. All three companies had a long tradition 
dating back to the 19th century. From the 1960’s through to the 1980’s, they commanded high market shares 
in the domestic markets for spirits and sugar, and had reinvested profits to diversify into other businesses.  
 The new merged company operated in five business areas: food and beverages (38% of turnover), 
food ingredients (15%), packaging (16%), machinery and technology (19%), and other (13%) (Table 1b). 
From the outset, Danisco pursued a strategy of related diversification within the broadly defined food 
industry. The stated strategy was that “the company wishes to be a first-class supplier to the international 
food industry on the global market and be a supplier of high quality foods and branded goods on selected 
European markets” (Danisco annual report 1989/1990, p. 5).  
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 The notions of ‘focus’ and investment in ‘related’ industries are already present in the inaugural 
annual report 1989/1990. Yet over time they shifted their meaning as Danisco went through two waves of 
restructuring. In the early 1990s Danisco sold its businesses in the machinery and ‘other’ area while 
strengthening the first three business areas. At the time, packaging for the food industry was seen as related 
to food ingredients as both serve the same customers, the processed food industry. Danisco’s first 
international acquisition was Box Corrugated in the UK packing industry in 1990, followed by several others 
(Table 1a). From 1989 to 1995 foreign sales in Western Europe mainly in the Scandinavian region and in the 
UK increased from 43% to 60% of turnover, while non-European sales declined from 20% to 8%.  
The focus was sharpened in 1999, following the appointment of a new CEO in 1997 and a period of 
unsatisfactory share price performance in 1998. Danisco announced a new strategy focusing on food 
ingredients, and sold businesses in branded foods and food packaging, including Danish Distillers with 
national-icon liquor brands like Aalborg. The packaging business had been expanded with acquisitions in the 
1990’s but was sold in 2000 to 2002. Acquisitions strengthened the core areas. The most strategically 
important acquisition was Finnish ingredients manufacturer Cultor OY in 1999, which gave the company a 
strong worldwide market position in the food ingredients business.  
By 2002 Western Europe accounted for 60% of sales, and outside Europe for 31%. Sales in 
Denmark continuously declined from 37% in 1989, to 31% in 1995, and to 12.5% in 2002. Over time, the 
industrial focus was defined narrower, and food ingredients – originally one of five areas –became the core 
of Danisco by 2001 (Table 1c). The size of the firm in terms of sales and employment increased during this 
process, but declined sharply with the sale of the packaging business in 2001/02, such that the number of 
employees in 2002 was actually lower than in 1990. Danisco also actively sought to diversify its ownership 
structure, from ca 5% non-Danish in 1989, to 15% in 1996 (Cortzen 1997, p 346), and 40% to 50% in 2003. 
In consequence, Danisco is more closely observd by financial analysts and institutional investors 
internationally. 
Following this restructuring, Danisco presents itself as developer and producer of food ingredients, 
sweeteners and sugar (annual report 2001/02). Danisco Ingredients is developing, manufacturing and 
distributing emulsifiers, stabilizers, flavors and enzymes based on natural raw materials. Worldwide, the 
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most important customer industries are bakeries (19% of sales), dairies and related industries (22%) and 
confectionary, condiments etc (9%) (annual report 2001/02). The products vary across countries and regions 
as consumer tastes are culturally bound. For example, in the USA, coffee flavors have become an important 
market, yet the thought of adding Vanilla or Hazelnut to their coffee would send cold shivers done the throat 
of traditional Italian or French consumers. Thus, while the food industry is becoming global, consumers 
require adaptation to local tastes, which Danisco provides with customized product developments.  
Danisco cooperates with customers to select and develop ingredients for new products, and to adapt 
them for different countries. It serves global customers with substantial market shares across major markets 
worldwide, such as Unilever, Kraft, Danone and Nestlé. To some degree, Danisco’s expansion is driven by 
the desire to serve global customers in all their key markets. However, regional and local firms also account 
for a major share of sales. 
Production is located in seven West European countries, in the USA, Australia and New Zealand, as 
well as in seven emerging markets. Emerging markets also account for a major part of the sales growth, with 
over 30% of ingredients sales earned outside Europe and North America. The expansion in Europe, North 
America and Australia has been mainly through acquisitions. In contrast, expansion in emerging markets is 
to a larger extent through organic growth. For instance, Danisco achieved 20% growth (before currency 
adjustment) in 2001/02 in North America, of which 17% were attributed to acquisitions, and 3% to organic 
growth. In contrast, growth in the Asia-Pacific region was 16%, of which 8% were due to acquisitions and 
8% by organic growth (annual report 2001/02). The difference of modes of growth is partly due to faster 
market growth in EM and partly due to the lack of local firms with attractive technological or marketing 
assets that would make them takeover targets.  
 In contrast, Danisco Sugar is a regional player in an industry closely linked to local suppliers, sugar-
beet farmers, and to the highly regulated EU agricultural policy. Quotas on sugar refining under this policy 
are a highly valued asset, and prominently reported in Danisco’s 2000/01 annual report (p.12). Danisco 
Sugar expanded by acquisition of refineries in Sweden, Finland, (former) East Germany and Lithuania.  
To sum up, Danisco has over the 1990s sharply focused it product portfolio by selling businesses in 
Denmark and acquiring businesses worldwide in its new core area. In consequence, by 2002 Danisco 
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Ingredients has become a global player in a niche market with substantive positions in all major markets 
worldwide.  
***** 
Table 2a to 2c approximately here 
***** 
3.2.  GN Great Nordic: From telegraph company to telecom equipment specialist 
GN Great Nordic A/S has a long and prestigious history dating back to 1867. The company constructed and 
operated international telegraph-networks, including the telegraph line through Russia to the Far East. It thus 
provided an essential communication infrastructure in the early ages of information technology, which was 
maintained through decades of political conflicts and war in Europe and Asia (Jacobsen 1997, Baark 1997). 
After World War II, GN transformed itself into an industrial conglomerate producing a wide range of 
products broadly related to communication technology (Iversen 2001). Most production was located in 
Denmark, while 60% of sales were in foreign markets, mainly Western Europe (Table 2b). 
In the 1990s, GN Great Nordic restructured its operations from a Danish conglomerate to a 
telecommunication equipment manufacturer operating in related global niche markets. Restructuring was 
initiated in 1987 after several years of unsatisfactory financial performance closure of business units, and 
sale of GN Laur. Knudsen and GN Batteriers. Hence turnover fell in that year by more than 30%, and the 
share of sales in Denmark fell from 44% at the peak of 1987 to 8% in 1993. From then on, GN pursued a 
strategy of acquiring complementary businesses, while selling non-core units (Table 2a). 
In 1991, GN participated in a joint venture operating Denmarks first private mobile phone service, 
Sonofon, which grew to 29% of turnover and was sold in 1999 at a considerable profit. The revenues of this 
and other sales were reinvested in acquisitions strengthening the global market position in the core business 
areas. The total of enterprises bought and sold from 1998 to 2001 adds to DKK 16 billion, which exceeds the 
total value of assets in 2001 of DKK 15 billion (annual report 2001).  
 The international pattern changed with each sale or acquisition. Eastern Europe is no more a focal 
region, despite the traditional business relations with Russia build since the 1870’s. After 1990, GN entered 
several new business activities in telecommunication related services, including equity stakes of up to 50% 
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in four joint ventures in Russia and in a GSM operator in Moldova. Reportedly, these businesses were 
running well, but they contributed only a small fraction to global turnover, while offering few synergies with 
the other business units. Hence, these businesses have been divested in the late 1990’s as part of GN’s drive 
for focus. In this way, GN discontinued operations that had grown beyond the scope of the refocused 
corporate strategy. In contrast, the almost equally long-standing contacts to China have been instrumental in 
establishing new production operations of GN Danavox (later GN ReSound) in 1987, and GN Netcom in 
2001.  
By the turn of the millennium GN had downscoped its operations to three businesses (Table 2c): GN 
Resound (hearing aids), GN Netcom (phone headsets) and NetTest (network testing equipment). Within these 
remaining business units, GN aggressively acquired complementary companies to build market share and to 
access distribution networks. The global nature of these businesses is underlined by the internationalization 
of the top management teams of the three businesses: Only 19 of 34 individuals are Danes, with citizens of 
the USA accounting for most of the remainder. Even one of the group headquarters, that of GN ReSound, 
was temporarily based in California during the integration of the acquired ReSound Corporation. 
The change of corporate strategy co-evolved with fundamental changes of business unit strategy. For 
instance, GN Netcom has rapidly expanded through several acquisitions since the mid 1990’s to reach new 
markets and to increase its market share in key markets, notably in North America. The rapid expansion 
broadened the product portfolio and fragmented organizational structures as each acquired firm contributed 
brand names, production sites, and R&D operations. In the necessary reorganization and integration of the 
operations, GN Netcom took a global perspective, and created an integrated structure utilizing locational 
advantages at different sites around the world. In 2001, a new production facility was established in 
cooperation with GN Resound in Xiamen, China, and most of the production was relocated from England 
and the US to China.  
To deliver products around the world timely and reliably, GN Netcom created a new integrated 
global supply chain. Freight forwarding and warehousing functions in Asia-Pacific were contracted out to a 
supply chain management business providing ‘total logistic solutions’. It ships the headsets from production 
sites in China to warehouses in Hong Kong and elsewhere in Asia, and from there to customers throughout 
 15
the Asia-Pacific region. Denmark hosts research and development and the corporate headquarters, while 
logistics are managed from Hong Kong. Of ca. 1000 employees in GN Netcom at the end of 2001, about half 
were in the US, ca 150 in China (mainly production), ca 80 in Denmark (mainly R&D), 114 in the UK and 
the remainder in sales operations around the world. Thus different activities are located where the relevant 
locational advantages are most conducive, and integrated by a global supply chain. 
To sum up, GN Great Nordic underwent fundamental changes of both corporate and business unit 
strategies. At a corporate level, GN restructured its portfolio to focus on related high technology sectors, and 
provided these core businesses with financial resources to strengthen their worldwide presence. At the 
business unit level, strategy aims not only at building strong market positions in all major regional markets, 
but at creating global operations that enhance competitiveness worldwide.  
 
3.3. Communalities and differences between the cases  
The two firms operate in very different industries, yet their change of corporate strategy shows remarkable 
similarities. This process of ‘globalfocusing’ is also the origin of accelerated expansion in emerging markets. 
The similarities of the two cases can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Both firms engaged in long-term global restructuring from conglomerate to focused strategy in 
closely related business areas over a period of more than 10 years. The restructuring involved 
shedding non-core business units, while acquiring businesses around the world in the core 
business area. In both cases, it has been a continuous process rather than a radical restructuring. 
Thus, the cases illustrate why Capron et al. (2001) found a link between acquisitions and asset 
divesture; yet contrary to Capron et al., the divesture may precede the acquisitions as when GN 
sold Sonofon and reinvested receipts in the (newly defined) core businesses. 
 Second, the focusing is in both cases related to rapid internationalization. While this did not lead 
to a lasting exit from any country, some countries have a substantially lower profile in the global 
operations in 2002 than they had a decade earlier, notably Russia in the case of GN, and the UK 
in the case of Danisco.  
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 Third, internationalization is primarily an outcome of business unit strategies (GN Netcom, 
Danisco Ingredients) rather than corporate strategy (GN, Danisco), albeit major decisions, such 
as entry in China, would be discussed at corporate level. 
 
Despite these similarities of global restructuring, a closer look at operations in specific markets reveals 
substantive differences. For instance, the Chinese operations fulfill a very different role in the two 
corporations. Both companies have established a major production facility in China within the past 5 years, 
yet with different objectives. GN Netcom pursues a vertical disintegration by relocating major parts of their 
production to China, and reorganizing global logistics such as to serve markets around the world from China. 
Danisco in contrast is pursuing local markets, and has established its operations mainly in view of the long-
term potential of the Chinese market. 
 These differences can be explained by structural differences in the industries in which the two firms 
operate, although both operate mainly in business-to-business (B2B) markets. GN Netcom is producing a 
product that can to a high degree be standardized and does not require customer-specific adaptation or 
integration in the customer’s supply chain. At the same time, demand in China is still relatively modest, 
because the key customer industries are yet very small. Danisco, on the other hand, needs local production 
and direct interaction with customers to develop and supply many of its ingredients. Demand in China is 
expected to pick up soon, and Danisco is positioning itself to exploit first-mover advantages. 
 
3.4. The broader picture 
To what extent are these two cases typical for Danish businesses, or is it a coincidence that the two firms 
selected as case studies show such similarities of corporate strategies? To investigate this question, I analyze 
the pattern of growth and scope of the largest Danish manufacturing firms over the past decade on the basis 
of archival data.  
 Who is Danish big business? It is common practice to focus on the largest firms according to a 
recent ranking, and then explain their development. However this creates the methodological problem of a 
survivor bias, i.e. the focus is on those firms that have been fast growing in recent time. To avoid this, I 
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select the sample based on the turnover in 1990 and in 2000. I include the 25 largest Danish firms in 1990 
plus the 25 largest firms in 2000, which adds to a set of 32 companies that form the basis for this analysis. 
This approach captures both declining firms and fast growing firms. Table 3 ranks these companies by their 
turnover in 1990, and records their rank in 2000. 
***  
Table 3 approximately here  
*** 
The ranking of firms has changed considerably over the decade, as some firms grew rapidly, while others 
grew slower or even declined in terms of turnover. The fastest growing firms have been involved in major 
mergers and acquisitions over the decade (Danish Crown, Group4Falck, Novo Nordisk), while firms that 
grew organically are ranked lower in 2000 than in 1990 (Rockwool, Danfoss, Bang & Olufsen). In terms of 
markets served, there was an about equal division between firms serving business or consumer markets in 
1990, yet over the decade B2B have gained in relative importance, while food producers merged and thus 
account for fewer of the top firms.  
As illustrated by our two case firms, sales volumes grow and decline rapidly as a result of M&A 
activity (or better “A&S” – acquisition and sales), such that relative positions also change fast. If we had 
chosen 2002 as final year, Danisco would for example rank lower as result of the sale of the packaging 
operations. By global standards, even the largest Danish firms are moderate in size. The second largest firm, 
Danish Crown had a turnover of DKK 40 bn in 2000, approximately US$ 5 bn. Moreover, 
internationalization is high, with over 90% of sales abroad being common (Benito et al. 2002).  
Table 3 also indicates the patterns and changes of internationalization and diversification for each 
firm, with considerable diversity of trends for individual firms, which vary with industries and ownership. 
Figure 1 summarizes the patterns, classifying firms by ownership and markets served. Globalfocusing is 
more pronounced among firms serving B2B markets, though in most firms the change has been less radical 
than in the two case firms. Few consumer goods manufacturers have gone through a (re-)focusing process as 
that described in the two cases. They rely to a larger extent on location-specific assets that can be exploited 
in related business lines, such as brand names, distribution networks, knowledge of consumer behavior and 
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marketing, and familiarity with institutional environment. In contrast, B2B customers would be more 
concerned with industry-specific technological capabilities of their suppliers, which are less location-bound. 
 
Figure 1: Strategies of the top Danish firms 
 Privately held Publicly traded 






Consumer goods producer 
Growing: 6 
Globalfocusing: none 





Notes: Growing  = increase of diversification and internationalization, Globalfocusing = decrease of diversification, 
increase in internationalization, Shrinking = reduction of both diversification and internationalization, Taken over = 
taken over by another domestic or foreign firm. 
 
However, there are exceptions from the general patterns: brewer Carlsberg has divested for 
instance its stake in the Tivoli-entertainment park, which was picked up by another company in our set, 
tobacco manufacturer Scandinavian Holding. Instead, Carlsberg aims to establish a worldwide presence for 
what is probably the best brand from Denmark. Among B2B manufacturers, privately held Danfoss and 
Grundfos, pursue broader applications of their core technological competences in thermostats and pumps 
respectively, which led to some increase of product scope. In two cases (EAC, Lauritzen,) the restructuring 
occurred under duress and also reduced the international profile in response to a severe financial crisis.  
The tendency to pursue globalfocusing appears more common among firms that are, like GN and 
Danisco, traded on the stock exchange. Of the 11 globalfocusing firms in the top-right quadrant, 7 have a 
controlling shareholder, such as a foundation, as it is common in Denmark. This however does not appear to 
affect the preference for focus. In most cases restructuring has been part of a long-term strategy that is 
implemented step-by-step as opportunities to divest or to acquire emerge. 
Despite the obvious opportunities arising on their doorsteps in Eastern Europe, large Danish firms 
have strengthened their emerging markets presence globally, also in Asia and Latin America. Eastern Europe 
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is the focus of expansion only for few firms, including Scandinavian Holding, Rockwool and Icopal. Hence, 
proximity is important to some, but not for the majority of firms. For firms that are global, or at least Europe-
wide, players, psychic distance is of diminishing relevance.  
In conclusion, many Danish firms have rapidly expanded their international presence, and often but 
not always the internationalization is related to changes of product scope. The analysis of the two cases and 
of the broader set of large Danish firms illuminates features that internationalization theories ought to 
explain. The driving forces of this accelerated growth appear to arise from changes in domestic and global 
industry structure, globalization of markets, and changes in the financial markets.  
Corporate restructuring has been one of the change processes that accelerated internationalization, 
notably if the restructuring led to a focus on a core business area within a global industry. This applies in 
particular to companies under stock market governance and for companies serving B2B markets like GN 
Great Nordic and Danisco.  However, not all firms follow this fashion. Some firms pursue continuous 
growth with more or less stable industry focus and diversification strategies. Fewer large firms grow through 
domestic mergers and regional market dominance, notably in the food processing industry.  
 
4. Drivers of globalfocusing  
The analysis shows firms aiming to establish themselves as global players in selected industries, while 
exiting those industries where they cannot achieve this objective. Globalization and increased 
competitiveness of key markets gives the competitive edge to industry specialists that can leverage industry-
specific resources across their global operations. On this global stage, key competitive advantages are gained 
by leveraging resources across the world, and by effective global integration of operations. 
Yet how is this process of globalfocusing influenced by changes in the firms’ internal and external 
environment? Explanations of the pattern have to consider multiple influences, including internal processes 
industrial dynamics, and institutional factors. Based on this exploratory study and the theoretical literature, I 
suggest propositions to guide future empirical research. 
 
4.1. Triggers of globalization: Managerial Innovation 
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Penrose (1959) and scholars building on her work (e.g. Teece et al. 1997) describe an ongoing process of 
firm growth into related businesses, and divestment if businesses that grow beyond the firm’s scope. 
Managers would thus continuously reassess their core competences, and adjust their profile to strengthen the 
core, or to divest business units that are becoming peripheral. Moreover, managerial initiatives may also be 
discontinuous, and initiate a process of globalfocusing, as firms develop innovative ways of leveraging 
resources across borders, or to transfer superior firm-specific resources to other markets2 Such organizational 
or managerial innovations may be stimulated by challenges encountered when globalfocusing, and they may 
initiate, facilitate or even accelerate the process.  
 Top management teams guide the corporate restructuring process, and their characteristics are 
crucial for the outcome of restructuring strategies (e.g. Uhlenbruck et al. 2003). Changes in the top 
management may bring new ideas and new mental models of the firm’s own core competences and the 
dynamics of the industry competition and thus lead to dramatic strategic and organizational changes as also 
observed in the USA, but not in Japan (Sakano and Lewin 1999). Top managers trained in an international 
environment, such as an international business school, would be more likely to contribute new ideas than 
those trained solely in a domestic context.  
In the case companies, major changes in the global strategy were associated with changes in the top 
management team. Alf Duch Pedersen took over as CEO of Danisco in 1997, and was a driving force in the 
changes implemented starting 1998/99. In GN, major changes were associated with Thomas Duer taking 
over in 1987, and Jørgen Lindegaard in 1997. Also, changes of business unit strategy may be associated with 
                                                 
2 It might also be that internationalization is driven by managers’ own growth ambitions (Geringer et al. 2000: 
76), especially where stock markets trade diversified firms at a discount. International growths may generate different 
types of ‘perks’ than domestic growth in form of international travel and recognition instead of domestic political 
power. Thirdly, both diversification and internationalization reduce the risk profile of a firm. They complement each 
other, as business cycles in different industries and different countries are normally less than perfectly positively 
correlated. But they may also substitute each other as both reduce the risk compared to the single business domestic 
firm. As argued above, managers may be more concerned about growth and risk diversification than shareholders. As 
shareholders may monitor diversification more closely based on past excesses, managers might pursue their personal 
objectives by means of internationalization. 
This argument implies that there is at least the potential for over-internationalization. Despite globalization of 
many industries, internationalization is not always better (Baden-Fuller and Stopford 1994), and Contractor et al. (2003) 
show that very high degrees of internationalization in fact negatively affect corporate performance for knowledge 
intensive service industries. We did not find evidence of over-internationalization in our cases, to the contrary, the logic 
for the current focus on global niche markets has been well presented by the managers I talked to, and by the 
companies’ own publications. 
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particular individuals, such as INSEAD-trained Niels Christensen who took over GN Netcom in 2000. Under 
his leadership global operations were reorganized with production in China and a new global demand-driven 
supply chain management. Hence, the first proposition focuses on the top management team:  
 
Proposition 1: Managerial and organizational innovations can induce or accelerate a process of 
globalfocusing. Such innovations may be triggered by changes in the top management. 
 
4.2. Globalization as self-reinforcing process 
Globalization of markets, notably B2B markets, increases competitive pressures for any business in an open 
economy. In many industries, global participation is necessary to achieve minimum efficient scales. On the 
global stage, firms face competitive pressures to both rationalize their vertical chain of activities through 
internalization or selective outsourcing, and at the same time to differentiate themselves from other major 
players. If a competitor finds new ways of gaining competitive advantage through better global integration, 
this creates pressures on competitors to either follow suit, or exit.  
Hence, changes in the structure of the industry are a determinant of business strategy (Porter 1980). 
Geographic expansion becomes a necessity once markets transcend national boundaries, and competitors 
become global players. International expansion may be a survival strategy, when the only alternative would 
be to become a regional niche player with a small market share, which rarely permits a satisfactory return on 
equity. Such a process could for instance be observed in the hearing aid industry, where GN ReSound 
participated in a global consolidation of the industry.  
 Global B2B customers seeking supplies at different production sites around the world can also drive 
globalization of markets. The automobile industry has been innovating new approaches to global purchasing 
and supplier relationships, as suppliers follow global manufacturers and in consequence internationalize (e.g. 
Dyer, 1997, Meyer, 2000). Among the case firms, Danisco is serving global manufacturers of processed 
food, and is positioning itself as global supplier with local operations near customers’ production sites at a 
time when the food industry is moving toward global sourcing. At the same time, Danisco is establishing 
production sites worldwide wherever specific ingredient can be found.  
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For many businesses serving B2B markets, the markets are themselves internationalizing as firms 
procure worldwide, and even establish global relationships with suppliers serving them in many different 
countries. Hence globalization of an industry is a self-reinforcing process (Figure 2): 
 
Proposition 2: The globalization of competitors and business partners in input and output markets creates 
competitive pressure that induces firms to pursue a globalfocusing strategy.  
 



















This proposition can be subdivided in several by focusing on different players in the input and output 
markets that the firm is operating in. Hence, globalization of 2a) competitors, 2b) customers, and 2c) 
suppliers may induce the firm to convert from a diversified but geographically limited strategy towards a 
global position in a narrower defined industry.  
 
4.3. Financial markets reinforce the process 
The institution most frequently referred to by managers and industry experts interviewed for this research are 
financial markets. Expectations and analytical perspectives of financial analysts were said to influence the 
design of corporate strategy, or at least its presentation to the public. The corporate governance literature also 
points to the importance of financial market institutions and ownership patterns as determinants of corporate 
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strategy (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Thomsen and Pedersen 2000, Ramaswamy et al. 2002). Excessive 
diversification is often seen as an indication of weak governance, and improvements in governance may 
induce downscoping, i.e. a reduction of the product scope of the firm (Hoskisson and Hitt 1984). How does 
thus the financial market sphere interact with the real sphere of corporate strategy? 
 Decision makers in investment funds and other (potential) shareholders rely on financial analysts 
who draw on their industry expertise, and a range of techniques of financial analysis to determine expected 
future earnings and share-prices, and thus their decisions over buying, holding or selling shares. Observing 
the difficulties that diversified firms have in open economies, they trade such firms at a ‘conglomerate 
discount’. Observing a globalization trend in an industry, and drawing on expertise in other comparable 
industries, they assess a firm’s potential in terms of the competition in the global market, rather than in its 
established domestic market. In these ways, developments in the real economy, affect financial analysts’ 
evaluation of a firm. 
 As managers are serving shareholders’ interests, and may be incentivized to do so by holding shares 
or share options, the expectations of financial analysts concern managers. If financial markets are efficient,3 
i.e. using all available information, then financial market expectations reflect the recognized changes in the 
industry. They thus reinforce changes in corporate strategies, thus guiding managers towards decisions they 
would have taken anyway in the interest of shareholders. Yet, this mechanism does not exist in firms that are 
not traded on stock exchanges, such as firms owned by families or foundations. Arguably, firms with a large 
proportion of international shareholders are subject to more such pressures. Both case companies increased 
non-Danish ownership over the past decade, and they actively communicate with the financial markets, e.g. 
through investor presentations and through their website. In these communications, they acknowledge 
financial market expectations, and emphasize the focus-aspects of their corporate strategy. Hence, financial 
markets have a reinforcing effect of the competitive pressures:  
 
                                                 
3 If markets are not efficient, but create bubbles in the financial sector, then the logic of the above argument would 
suggest that these bubbles may translate into bubbles in the real sector, and could lead to excessive focusing. 
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Proposition 3: Financial market expectations create pressures by trading diversified firms at a 
“conglomerate discount”. Hence, firms that are traded on stock markets are more likely follow a 
globalfocusing strategy than firms that are privately held. 
 
This effect is partly endogeneous, i.e. reinforcing development under way in the industry, as expectations are 
formed by drawing on information from within the industry and related industries. However, the effect is 
also partly exogeneous as expectations are formed by drawing on information from outside the industry, and 
using valuation methods that may evolve over time as a result of new analytical techniques or scholarly 
opinion (Figure 3).  
 






















globalfocusing Focal firm globalfocusing
Liberalization  
of industry  
Liberalization of  
customer industry  
 
4.4. Triggers of globalization: Liberalization 
Several authors recently suggested a systematic link between institutional development, economic 
liberalization, and firms’ optimal degree of diversification (Khanna and Palepu 2000, Kock and Guillén 
2001, Cazurro-Cuervo and Toulan 2002). This literature directs attention to institutional changes creating 
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competitive pressures that eventually lead to de-diversification. They may alter the competitive environments 
in factor and product markets, and thus change the availability of external resources, and the relative value of 
firms’ internal resources. It tends to be a gradual, path-dependent process (North 1991), and the radical 
changes recently observed and analyzed in some emerging markets are the exception, not the rule. Yet 
gradual change too affects corporate strategies. Even small changes in institutions governing input, output 
and financial markets can induce a process of industrial restructuring.  
Moreover, deregulation alters the competitive dynamics in the pertinent industries by allowing prices 
to float more freely, by reducing costs of import competitors, and by allowing domestic and foreign entry. 
These enhanced competitive pressures limit firms’ ability to enter into unrelated industries, as the “liability 
of foreignness” declines relative to what we might call “liability the industry outsider”, who may know the 
local contexts, but understands little of the technologies and the competitive strategies employed in unrelated 
industries.  
Hence, the pertinent question is, how did institutional changes trigger or accelerate the process of 
globalfocusing in Denmark? The European Community, and later the European Union, has gone through a 
gradual process of liberalizing markets, notably when preparing ‘project 1992’. The liberalization initially 
led to a concentration process in a number of industries, including the merger that created Danisco in 1989. 
Also, the subsequent streamlining of the corporate profile, sale of the machinery businesses, and acquisitions 
of food and packaging related businesses, can be seen as an outcome the corporate and industrial 
restructuring induced by ‘project 1992’ (Cortzen 1997). 
The cases point moreover to de-regulation of specific customer industries as trigger for changes in 
competitive dynamics. Liberalization of telecommunications increased international procurement by that 
industry, which opened new markets and increased competition for equipment suppliers, such as GN NetTest. 
Changes in the public health care system opened for more international entry of suppliers of hearing aids, 
such as GN ReSound. These changes led to gradual changes in competitive behavior in the industry, which 
contrasts with the literature that focuses on radical changes such as liberalization and privatization in Latin 
America (Khanna and Palepu 2000, Kock and Guillén 2001).  
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In conclusion, liberalization and other policy changes can induce globalfocusing strategies. This 
effect may be gradual, and have considerable time lags. Moreover, the crucial institutional changes may 
occur in related industries or in other countries, but create opportunities for those firms who may aim to 
supply the liberalized industry (Figure 3). Hence the next proposition is:  
 
Proposition 4: Liberalization can trigger a process of globalfocusing, possibly with time lags after the 
change in the legal framework.  
 
4.4. No risk, no fun 
I have in this paper taken a positive-analytical perspective to analyze which strategies firms pursue, and why. 
Yet what are the financial performance implications of globalfocusing? Interviewees consistently believed 
that globalfocusing would be suitable for the pertinent firms. A systematic analysis of this belief is beyond 
the scope of this study, as it would require a larger sample of firms that could be analyzed with multivariate 
analysis (as in Markides 1995). However, both theoretical considerations and case evidence suggest that a 
strategy of globalfocusing implies certain performance risks: 
Firstly, a firm focusing on a single industry is exposed to the business cycles in that industry, while a 
moderately diversified firm can shift some of its resources between industries to adjust for cyclical demand. 
Financial investors may not be very concerned about this risk, as they can diversify risk (though not risk of 
bankruptcy, which creates extra costs that cannot be diversified). However, stakeholders with high firm-
specific investments, notably rank-and-file employees and small supplier firms cannot protect themselves 
against the higher risk of their firm. 
Secondly, the process of focusing a conglomerate through acquisitions and sales of businesses is 
inherently risky because acquisitions often fail to meet the acquirer’s expectations (e.g. Ravenscraft and 
Scherer 1987, Jensen 1988). Failure arises from a variety of sources such as poor diligence and poor 
management of the integration process. Firms acquiring multiple firms can learn how to manage acquisition 
processes and thus reduce the possibility of failure. Yet, even so, any acquisition is a risky strategic decision. 
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Managers are naturally reluctant to discuss failures of acquisitions, except in cases that are widely 
discussed in the press. GN’s acquisition of the French company Phonetics illustrates both sources of risk: the 
NetTest division suffered from both the collapse of demand in the network testing equipment industry, and 
from problems associated with integrating Phonetics. Eventually the division was sold for a symbolical 1 
DKK in December 2002. Hence, both theoretical considerations and the case evidence point to the risks 
associated with global focusing: 
 
Proposition 5: Firms pursuing a globalfocusing strategy have to take high-risk decisions, and thus have 
higher variance of performance.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This longitudinal study explored two key issues of global strategy, diversification and internationalization, 
and has shown that the two strategies are empirically related. In extending Capron et al.’s (2001) argument 
that acquisitions and divestments are related, I argue that international acquisitions and domestic divestments 
are part of the same process of globalfocusing. This process is driven not only by internal managerial and 
organization innovations, but is complemented by the evolution of the industry as well liberalization of the 
institutional environment and financial markets.  
 To explain the timing, however, institutional change appears often crucial. Institutional change is not 
necessarily associated with a single event that changes domestic competition. In the European Union, it is the 
outcome of cumulative changes in both the regulatory institutional framework and in the industrial structure. 
In consequence, corporate ambitions for growth, which up to the 1970s may have led to branching out in 
related or unrelated industries within a domestic market, may now be pursued by internationalization. The 
more open markets for goods, services and capital, the more firms pursue focused strategies, and 
consequently global or at least Europe-wide strategies (Rugman and Verbeke 2003). This trend can be 
observed in particular in B2B businesses, which rely to a larger extent on mobile firm-specific advantages, it 
applies less to consumer goods MNEs that rely to a larger extent on location-bound firm-specific advantages, 
such as marketing assets. 
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The globalfocusing has dramatic implications for management. Two decades ago, companies had a 
choice between being a big fish in a small pond, and being a small fish in a big pond. They no longer have 
that choice, at least not in Europe. Globalization has created one big ocean, where everyone competes with 
everyone else who happens to make similar products. As Simon (1996) has pointed out, many medium size 
German “Hidden Champions” have been very successful by becoming a global market leader in a specific 
market niche. The Danish case firms in this research have transformed themselves towards the Simon’s 
model of the global specialist, as a domestic conglomerate strategy did no longer yield satisfactory returns.  
In response to environmental change, companies develop new business models that utilize 
comparative advantages at different locations worldwide, disaggregate the supply chain geographically, yet 
integrate the operative structures globally. This suggests major implications for firms in markets opening to 
global competition: they have to develop new organizational structures, new management profiles, and adapt 
capabilities throughout the organization such that interaction across borders becomes a way of live for 
everyone in sales, management or R&D functions. For example, cross-cultural communication and language 
skills are needed throughout the organization to communicate across borders. 
This study is hoped to stimulate further research. I analyze the ‘mature’ issue of internationalization 
by going back to basic principles, and employing an exploratory and qualitative research approach. This 
approach allows to explore interdependencies that are neglected by the dominant paradigms in the field. Yet 
this exploratory method has limitations. I have addressed the main problem of case research, generalizability, 
by reviewing key data in the population of Danish firms. Future research may formally test the propositions 
in Denmark and other countries.  
 The study suggests that scholars studying international strategy and internationalization processes 
ought to pay more explicit attention to the institutions of the home environment of the firm. 
Internationalization is (also) a function of changes in institutions and industrial structure in its domestic 
markets, including the financial markets. More generally, this study shows that issues of domestic and 
international strategy are interdependent. In consequence, the divide in academic writings between strategic 
and international management should be overcome. 
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Table 1a: Building and Restructuring of Danisco, 1989-2002 
Year Business Units Sold Businesses acquired 
1989 Merger of Danish Destillers, Danish Sugar and AS Danisco 
1989 De Forende Papirfabrikker (75%); 
DDS Filtration 
Raackmann Fabriker, Nykøbing Sugar Factory, 
Mette Munk 




Frigodan AS; Bux Corrugated Containers Ltd (UK); 
Kirk Frozen Foods AS;  Irma Vin AS; Svendborg 
Fabrikker; Peter F. Heering AS; Skelmersdale 
Packaging Lts (UK) 
1991 Dansk Estrella; 
Farma Food AS 
Zuckerfabrik Stralsund ((East-) Germany); Bæhnkes 
Delikatessefabrikker AS; Colon Embalage 
(outstanding 50%); Nyborg Lynfrost AS; Vegejardin 
(Spain) 
1992  Sockerbolaget AB (Sweden); Trinity Paper 
Packaging Ltd (UK) 
1993 Novenco; 
Niro AS 
Chesterfield Packaging Ltd (UK); Dansk Carna 
Consum AS; Otto Nielsen Emballage AS 
1994  Vinhuset Norden; Pektin Smirice (Czech Rep); 
Howard D Webb (UK) 
1995  Unibag AS (increase to 100%); Clyde Corrugated 
(UK); Calder Corrugated (UK); Herning 
Aeskeindustri AS; Hamburger Wellpappenfabrik 
(Germany) 
1996  Crown Packaging Group Ltd (UK); Crown 
Corrugated Ltd (UK); Celtic Packaging UK); 
Amadeus Packaging (UK); Westward Packaging; 
CMB Flexible; IL Recycling (UK); Woodcocks; 
Beacon Ltd; Groko Foods (NL); Monoplast AS 
(Norway) 
1997  Schupbach AG (Switzerland); Fri-d’Or BV 
(Netherlands); Borthwicks plc (UK); Langfern 
Packaging Ltd (UK) 
1998 Better Brands 
I.D. Nordic 
Esterchem Sdn Bhd (Malaysia); Sugar Lithuania; 
Becks Flavours; RolDan Spzoo (Poland); Wisby 
(Germany/Denmark) 
1999 Danisco Pack Denmark 
Danisco Paper 
Ewos 
Pesquera Pacific Protein 
Danisco Distillers 
March Packaging Group (UK) 
Sidlaw PLC (UK) 
Cultor OY (Finland) 
2000 Danisco Foods’ vegetable business 
Danisco Foods’ Dutch frozen food business 
 
2001 Danisco Flexible (packaging) 
Danisco Pack UK 
Danisco Foods, remaining parts 
Germantown (Australia);  
Florida Flavours (USA) 
2002  Perlarom (Belgium) 
 
Source: Danisco annual report, various years.  
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Table 1b: Danisco 1989/1990  
Line of 
Business 




West Europe North 
America 
Other 
Danish Sugar yes UK, N, D - - 
Havnemøllerne (50%) yes - - - 
Danish Distillers yes - - - 





yes S, N, NL, D - - 
Grindsted products yes D, UK, F, E, CH, NL, B USA 
Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Brazil 





yes - - - 
Raackmann Fabriker yes N, S, UK, D, NL - - 
Colon Embalage (50%) yes - - - 




yes - - - 
Niro-Atomizer  Ca 2349 yes F, E, CH, I, B, UK, NL, D USA 
Japan, Mal, Singapore, 
Mexcio, Argentinia, 
Brazil, AUS, NZ 
Technology 
and 
Machinery Møller & Jochumsen Ca  677 
2111 
yes - - - 





Farma Food yes - - - 
Other 
Activities 
(to be sold) I. Krüger (engineering) Ca 876 
2598 
yes - - - 
 Total Sales 16005  36.7% 37.0% 8.3% 11.6% 
 Total Employment  11360     
Note: Due to the merger the accounting year 1989/1990 had 16 months (January 1989 to April 1990). Regional breakdown of sales 
refer to 1990/1991 as now such data were reported for 1989/1990. 
 
Table 1c: Danisco 2001/2002 
Line of 
Business 



















/ Danisco Cultor  n.a. yes 
FIN, UK, 
D, F, NL, 
B, E, I, N, 























n.a. - A, CH, FIN, UK - - - - 
- 
Danisco Sugar  n.a. yes S, FIN, N, D, ISL, 
Lithuania 





 yes A, D, I,  F, UK, E 
Poland, 
Romania    
- 
Other Foods, etc. 1049  yes FIN, D, NL - - - - 
- 
Ingredients & Sw. 2% 35% 4% 28% 9% 18% 4% 





12.5% 48.0% 7.6% 13.7% 4.8% 8.1% 4.5%
Total Employment  9105 32% 33% 12% 9% 8% 5% 1% 
Source: Danisco Annual Report 2002 (financial year May 2001 to April 2002), countries listed are those where 
Danisco has a subsidiary company listed in the annual report. 
 35
Table 2a: The Restructuring of GN Great Nordic 1990-2002 
Year Business Units Sold Businesses acquired 
1990 GN Laur. Knudsen (isolation materials) Navtel, Canada (NT) 
Madsen Electronics (GNR) 
1991 --- Danish Polish Batteries (partial) 
1992 GN Batteries International GN Rawthorn, UK 
Comtext International (increase to 100%) 
GN Con Tec Teledate, SpA (increase to 100%) 
1994 GN Communications 
GN FileTech 
Danatronics, Switzerland 
Laser Precision Corp, USA 
1995 --- Audiologic, USA 
Talkline Nordic 
1996 --- Azure technologies, USA 
Mark Group, USA 
Unex, USA (GNN) 
Sonofon (further 17.5% to 53.5%) 
1997 GN Rawthorn, UK Italiana Audioprotesi, 90% (GNR) 
Bimcom, UK 
Siemens OTE, USA (NT) 
1998 --- Online Resource Center, Russia, 48.7% (TS) 
ACS Wireless; USA (GNN) 
Fastware, France (NT) 
Faxnet, 22% (GNC) 
1999 Faxnet, sale of partial ownership (GNC) ReSound, USA (for US$ 182m; GNR) 
PK Technology (for US$ 45m, NT)  
RTC Page (TS) 
Danplex (for DKK 15m) GNR) 
EAC-GN Communications (NT) 
GN Resound China, increase of equity to 100% 
2000 GN Comtext’s network business 
Sonofon (53.5% equity stake) 
York Sensors (for US$ 3m, NT) 
AB Transistors, Sweden (GNN) 
Beltone (for DKK 3.1bn, GNR) 
Voxtel, 20% stake (TS) 
JABRA, USA (for US$ 62m, GNN) 
Hortmann, Germany (GNR) 
GM Iris (NT) 
Hello Direct, USA (for US$ 95m, GNN) 
Phonetics, France (for DKK 9.1bn, NT) 
Optran (NT) 
ICS Medical, USA (for US$ 10.6m, GNR) 
2001 Denerco & ZAO, St. Petersburg (TS) 
GN Comtext 
Sensortech (GNN) 
Auditdata, increase of equity to 100% (GNR) 
Dana Japan (GNR) 
Ultravox Holdings (GNR) 
2002 Last sale of residential real estate  
NetTest (NT) 
Claria Headsets, Australia (GNN) 
Source: GN Great Nordic, annual report, various years. 
Abbreviations: GNN = GN Netcom, GNR = GN ReSound (previously GN Danavox), NT = NetTest (previously GN 
Elmi), GNC = GN Comtext, TS = GN Store Nordiske Telegraf-Selskab.  
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Table 2b: GN Great Nordic in 1990 














(later GN ReSound) 292 708 yes 
UK, N, 
D, NL, S 
- Canada, 
USA China Brazil 
GN Elmi 




USA - AUS 
GN Netcom 187 327 yes UK, D, F - Canada, USA - - 
GN Batteries 93 146 yes - - - - - 
GN Communications  166 224 yes - -   - 
GN DataCom 140 161 yes D, UK, F - USA Japan - 
GN FileTech 19 22 yes - - - - - 
GN Telegraph Co. 9 7 yes - Russia*, Poland* - Japan* - 
GN Ejendomme 
(real estate) 27 7 yes UK 
- 
- - - 
Other (incl. GN Citytel, 
Store Nord Energi) 274** 577** yes - 
- 
- - - 
Total Sales 1396  40.0% 36.6% 7.4% 12.9% 3.1% 
Total Employment  2404       
Source: GN Great Nordic, annual report1990.  
Notes: *ownership of telegraph cables and similar assets, not affiliates. ** calculated as difference between total and 
available divisional sales figures. 
 
Table 2c: GN Great Nordic in 2001 










America Asia Other 
GN Netcom  
(headphones) 1930 944 yes 
UK, D, F, 









(hearing aids) 2906 3417 yes 
D, NL, 















3327 1484 yes 
D, UK, E, 










(incl. Telegraph Co,  
real estate) 
160 ? yes 
UK  Russia, 
Moldova 
- - - 
Total Sales 7319  3% 37% 47% 12%% 1% 
Total Employment  6213*       
Source: GN Great Nordic, annual report2001.  
















Industry profile 2000 Trend  
1990-2000 
A.P. Møller Group 1 1 Worldwide > 100 countries Global company B 
Shipping (core biz), oil and gas 
exploration, shipbuilding, air 
travel, industrial businesses, 
retail trade, IT services 
Diversified conglomerate 
EAC (ØK) 2 16 11 Asia, 4 LA, Germany, New Zealand, Nigeria,  
Reorganization and focus 
on Asia and LA only B/C 
Related diversified 
conglomerate mainly in food 
and transport. 
Major downscoping, exit from most 
European markets 
MD Foods (Arla) 3 11 W. Europe, 2 NA, 4 CEE, Japan Argentina, Saudi Arabia
Rapid I especially by 
acquisition of Arla C 
Milk and closely related 
products 
Transport division divested; else focus 
on growth in the same industry 
Danisco 4 10 13 W Europe, 2 NA, 6 CEE, 5 LA, 5 Asia Continued rapid I B Focus on food ingredients Major downscoping 
Lauritzen Group 
(Vesterhavet) 5  6
W Europe, 4 CEE, 6 LA, 2 
Asia 
Restructuring reduced 
international profile*) B/C 
Shipping and industrial 
conglomerate 
Massive downsizing in 2001 divesting 
non-shipping interests 
FLS Industries 6 7 W Europe, 3 NA, 3 CEE, 6 Asia, 6 LA, 2 Africa  Continued rapid I B 
Diversified, but with focus on 
cement Considerable downscoping  
Danish Crown 7 2 W Europe, AUS,   4 CEE, 5 Asia Rapid I C 
slaughter-houses, branded meat 
and related products 
Rapid growth in same industry, with 
some increase in diversification 
Carlsberg Group 8 3 W Europe, USA, 4 CEE, 4 Asia, Turkey, Malawi Rapid I C 
Focus on beer with interest in 
other drinks businesses 
Divestment of peripheral business 
(Copenhagen Porcelain, Tivoli) 
ISS + 9 4 W Europe, 6 CEE, 10 Asia, 2 LA, (no USA!) 
Continued rapid I through 
acquisitions B Service conglomerate 
Conglomerate with increasing 
diversification within services 
Novo Nordisk 10 5 
W Europe, 4 NA, 3 CEE, 2 
LA, 10 Asia, Turkey, South 
Africa 
Continued rapid I B Focus on health care products Rapid growth in both industries, then share-split creating Novozymes 
Danfoss  11 12 W Europe, 4 NA, 14 CEE, 8 LA, 9 Asia, 3 Africa Continued rapid I B/C Related diversification 
Minor increase in scope of 
diversification 
Skandinavian Holding  12 9 W Europe, 2 NA, 6 CEE, Indonesia, Dominican Rep. Rapid I C 
Tobacco products, minority 
stake in Tivoli 
Continued growth in core business, 
with a new side interest. 
Superfos  13 > 25 W Europe, USA, 2 CEE Gradual I B Focus on Packing products Major downscoping 
Rockwool 14 17 W Europe, 2 NA, 11 CEE, Malaysia Continued rapid I B 
Rock wool for construction 
related applications 
Some di-vestment of non-construction 
related businesses 
J Villadsens Fabrikker 
(Icopal) 15  21
W Europe, 2 NA, 5 CEE, 
Mexico Continued rapid I C 
Roofing and closely related 
products Some downscoping 
Vestjyske Slagter 16 - --- --- C --- Integrated in Danish Crown 
Steff Houlberg 17 20 France Little I C Meat processing Little change in profile 
Grundfos (Due Jensen 
Fond) 18  13
W Europe, 4 NA, 4 CEE, 9 
Asia, 3 LA, Turkey Continued rapid I B 
Pumps for a growing variety of 
applications 
Continuous growth in same industry, 
growing into new applications 
Ranked by sales 1990 
 
 
Egmont Holding 19 14 W Europe, Japan, 9 CEE, 7 Asia, Turkey Continued I C 
Publishing and new media 
entertainment Diversification into new media 
Bang & Olufsen 20 23 W Europe, USA, Japan Gradual I, mainly export-based  C 
Audio and video, with 20% 
other activities Growth of non-core business 
Lego Systems 21 - *) *) C Toys, theme parks and other activities 
Diversification into electronic toys and 
theme parks 
Royal Dane Quality 22 - --- --- C --- Integrated in Danish Crown 
Kløver Mælk 23 >25 --- --- C --- No change until 1997, then integrated in Arla Foods 
Aarhus Oliefabrik 24 >25 
UK, Norway, France, USA, 
Australia, Russia, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Sri Lanka, 3 Africa, 
Continued I C Oils and fats, and related products Continuous growth in same industry 
Slagteriregion Syd 25 - --- --- C --- Integrated in Danish Crown 
Falck (Group4Falck) + 26 8 
W Europe, 3 NA, 14 CEE, 9 
Middle East, 6 Asia, Turkey, 
South Africa 
Rapid I, esp. by merger 
with Group4 B 
Security, safety and other 
business services 
Di-vestment of manufacturing and 
focus on related service sect0rs 
Velux  - 15 4 W Europe, 2 CEE Early stage of I B/C Windows and related products Related diversification 
GN Great Nordic -  18 W Europe, 4 NA, 3 CEE, 7 Asia, 2 LA, South Africa  Continued rapid I B 
Closely related diversification in 
telecom equipment 
Major downscoping while growing 
core businesses 
Vestas Wind Systems - 19 W Europe, USA, India Gradual I B Wind Energy Turbine Continued focus on wind energy technology 
Lundbeck  - 22 W Europe, 3 NA, 9 CEE, Mexico, South Africa Rapid I of sales B Drugs for CNS diseases 
Continued focus on a segment of 
pharmaceuticals market 
Novozymes - 25 W Europe, 2 NA, 6 Asia, 2 LA, Turkey, South Africa Gradual I B Enzymes Focus on enzymes 
Elsam  - 24 3 W Europe Little I B/C Electricity and distant heating Related diversification 
Sources: Sales data: Danmarks Størreste Virksomheder, and data from recent company reports. 
Notes: + Manufacturing accounted for a small share of turnover in 1990, by 2000 the firm has entirely focused on services.  
Markets: B= selling mainly in B2B markets, C = selling mainly consumer goods, B/C = service both business and consumer markets. 
International profile lists countries in which the firm has affiliates. Country group abbreviations: NA = North America and Australasia (USA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand), LA = Latin America, CEE = Central and Eastern Europe. 
*) Data are not available from public sources.  
--- Firm is not yet / no more in existence. 
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